When a clinic system is acquired by an integrated delivery system (IDS), the ownership change includes both vertical integration with the hospital(s), and horizontal integration with the IDS's previously owned or "legacy" clinics, causing increased market concentration in physician services. Although there is a robust literature on the impact of hospital market concentration, the literature on physician market concentration is sparse. The objective of this study is to determine the impact on physician prices when two IDSs acquired three multispecialty clinic systems in Minneapolis-St Paul, Minnesota at the end of 2007, using commercial claims data from a large health plan (2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011).
1 | INTRODUCTION
| Background
In reaction to health reform efforts, U.S. hospitals have accelerated the trend toward acquisition of physician practices. More than half of physician practices now are owned by hospitals or integrated delivery systems (Kocher and Sahni, 2011) . This trend toward hospital ownership of physician practices facilitates the development of accountable care organizations (ACOs), in part for participation in the Medicare Shared Savings Program.
1 In theory, a vertically integrated delivery system (IDS), providing both hospital and physician services, should be able to accept global reimbursement for care from public and private payers, and more easily coordinate care, creating the possibility of higher quality, lower cost care. However, there is concern that this concentration in the provider market may result in increased bargaining power and higher prices (Baker et al., 2015a) .
1 ACOs can be formed around a vertically IDS, or through an agreement between separate organizations to negotiate jointly with public and private payers to provide a full spectrum of care. While the Federal Trade Commission has repeatedly stated that antitrust issues should not inhibit the formation of ACOs (see for example Simowicz and Lewis, 2013 and Anderson, 2014) , ACOs do need to be careful to not engage in anticompetitive behavior. Threshold questions asked by the commission include whether there is potential for cost savings or quality improvement, and whether true integration takes place or just joint negotiation that increases market power (Anderson, 2014).
When a stand-alone hospital system acquires a clinic system, 2 the result is vertical integration. However, when the clinic system is acquired by an IDS that already owns other clinic systems, the result is both vertical integration with the IDS's hospital(s) and horizontal integration with the IDS's previously owned or "legacy" clinics, causing increased concentration in the physician services' market. We examine the impact of vertical integration causing a meaningful change in physician market concentration. Three large multispecialty clinic systems in the Minneapolis-St. Paul ("Twin Cities") metropolitan area were acquired by two hospitalowned IDSs at the end of 2007. The two IDSs already owned the two largest clinic systems in the metropolitan area. We examine the impact of these acquisitions on a measure of average physician prices and on prices for several high-volume physician services. A rich dataset allows us to attribute health plan enrollees to clinics in IDSs or to independent clinic systems, and to control for the health risk of enrollees in the attributed population. Our difference-in-differences research design allows us to distinguish between price differences due to the acquisition versus differences due to the IDSs' selection of the clinic systems based on time-invariant clinic system characteristics.
| Theoretical framework and previous empirical work
The "intervention" in this analysis is the acquisition of a multispecialty clinic system by a hospital-owned IDS. Although some types of vertical 3 relations among hospitals and physicians have received attention, including exclusive and "most favored nations" contracts, hospital ownership itself has not been a frequent subject of study. Nor has it received significant antitrust scrutiny (Gaynor, 2006, Gaynor and Town, 2011) , possibly due to a lack of relevant data and because previous studies in other industries found vertical integration actually lowered prices (Gaynor, 2006) . Furthermore, both the predicted effect of vertical integration on prices in the health care industry and the empirical results described below are ambiguous.
| Theoretical frameworks for analyzing vertical integration
Two competing theories lead to the ambiguous predicted effect of vertical integration between a stand-alone hospital and a clinic system: transaction costs and tied purchasing. If transaction costs are reduced and other efficiencies are gained through factors such as strengthened administrative controls and economies of scope, we would expect to see prices decline for both the hospitals and the clinic systems (Williamson, 1988) . Although transaction cost theory is important in many industries, there is little empirical support for the theory of reduced prices due to reduced transaction costs in physician-hospital integration, as noted below. Alternatively, Gal-Or (1999) presents a theory predicting that tying the hospital and physicians together in contracting with health plans will increase prices through market power extension. In this tying scenario, the payer must contract with both entities to gain access to either. Through tied contracting, the entity with market power can extend its market power to the other. This theory predicts that the entity (hospital or clinic system) with weaker market power prior to integration benefits from the tie to the stronger entity after integration.
| Empirical studies of vertical integration
In one of the earliest studies of the impact of vertical integration on total health expenditures, Madison (2004) used cross-sectional data to demonstrate a link between increasingly tight physician-hospital relationships 4 and higher total expenditures.
Similarly, Kralewski et al. (2014) found that patients attributed to physician-owned primary care clinics received better quality care than patients attributed to hospital-owned practices, resulting in less avoidable utilization and ultimately, lower per capita costs of care. Both studies used cross-sectional data, limiting our ability to make causal interpretations. 2 We use the term "clinic system" rather than "physician practice" to emphasize that the organization may have multiple locations. A clinic system may be independent or part of an IDS.
3 Following Gaynor (2006) , we use the term "vertical integration" to describe an ownership relation between a hospital and a physician practice, though services are often complementary rather than vertically integrated.
4 Madison (2004) describes seven types of physician hospital affiliations used by the American Hospital Association: independent practice associations, Physician-Hospital Organizations (PHOs), management services organizations, integrated salary models (arrangements under which hospitals salary physicians to provide medical care), medical foundations, equity models, and group practices without walls. She adopts the categories of low integration (independent practice associations, PHOs) and high integration (the other five) proposed by Dynan et al. (1998) .
The literature examining the impact of vertical integration on hospital prices is expanding and now includes several carefully designed studies. Cuellar and Gertler (2006) and Ciliberto and Dranove (2006) both used panel data to evaluate the link between hospital prices and increasingly tight physician-hospital relationships as defined by the American Hospital Association Annual Survey. Cuellar and Gertler (2006) , using data from Arizona, Florida, and Wisconsin, found tight physician-hospital relationships led to higher hospital prices. Their estimated cost functions indicated virtually no efficiency gains from vertical integration. Ciliberto and Dranove (2006) found more mixed results, with hospital prices in California decreasing, on average, as physician-hospital relationships tighten. In a recent addition to the literature, Baker et al. (2014a) used similar definitions of physician-hospital relationships and panel data to demonstrate increased hospital prices for fully integrated systems. This was the first longitudinal study of the effect of vertical integration on hospital prices that relied on national data.
The impact of vertical integration on physician prices is less well-documented. One of the barriers to this work is difficulty in categorizing physicians by their vertical integration status. We identified a single peer-reviewed publication that attempted to estimate the effect of vertical integration on physician prices (Neprash et al., 2015) . They modeled prices paid by commercial health plans as a function of vertical integration in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Their vertical integration measure was based on the proportion of physicians in the MSA billing Medicare for outpatient visits using place of service code 22, indicating services delivered in an outpatient hospital facility. This exploits a feature of Medicare reimbursement that allows a physician practice to bill as an outpatient hospital location if it has common ownership with a hospital and meets some additional requirements (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2011). Unfortunately, because one of the additional requirements is a common medical record system, this otherwise well-designed study may have considerable measurement error because years may elapse between the acquisition of a clinic system by an IDS and the implementation of common medical record systems. This method could cause considerable delay in identifying an acquisition.
Another method of identifying acquisitions relies on common provider tax identification numbers (TINs) to categorize clinic systems as vertically integrated. In a working paper, Capps et al. (2015) used this method and some additional grouping of TINs based on SK&A market data, to study the impact of vertical integration on physician prices in a number of metropolitan statistical areas. They demonstrated a statistically significant increase in physician prices after vertical integration, averaging 13.7% in the postintegration years. The TIN-based identification method could also be subject to measurement error as acquired clinic systems may continue to bill using their pre-acquisition TINs for some time after the acquisition. For example, two of the three acquisitions considered in our work continued to bill using their pre-acquisition TIN throughout the four-year post-acquisition observation period. Recognition of the acquisition could be delayed if the SK&A data did not note this additional TIN in their ownership mapping in a timely way. Mislabeling the acquisition date will cause misestimation of the timing of the acquisition effect. Capps et al. (2015) found a large increase in prices (their Figure 3) immediately in the (possibly misestimated) year of acquisition, potentially not recognizing a delay for incorporating the new clinic locations into the acquiring organizations' contracts.
| Theoretical framework for analyzing horizontal integration
The theory becomes more complex when a clinic system is acquired by an existing IDS, rather than a stand-alone hospital. In this case, we have vertical integration between the member hospital(s) and the new clinic system, and also horizontal integration between the legacy clinics in the IDS and the newly-acquired clinic system. In addition to the theories associated with vertical integration (transaction costs and tied purchasing), we must consider the impact of increased market concentration through horizontal integration. We expect that reducing the number of competing clinics in the market will lead to increased physician prices.
| Empirical studies of horizontal integration
Compared with the robust literature on the impact of hospital market concentration (summarized in Gaynor and Town [2012] ), the literature on physician market concentration is sparse. One early study (Schneider et al., 2008) used a cross-sectional design to identify an association between more highly-concentrated California physician markets and higher prices. Baker et al. (2014b) also relied on a cross-sectional design to find an association between concentration in physician markets and higher prices for evaluation and management visits, as did Austin and Baker (2015) for concentration in physician markets and prices of surgical procedures. Dunn and Shapiro (2012) used repeated cross sections to demonstrate increased cardiologist and orthopedist prices in commercial markets as physician market consolidation increases. In this work, they controlled for concentration in the insurance market, which affects the relative bargaining power of physicians and insurers.
| Our framework
Our setting combines both horizontal and vertical integration. As noted above, the competing theories of vertical integration do not permit an unambiguous prediction about the effects of vertical integration on physician prices. However, the theory concerning the effects of horizontal integration on physician prices is more explicit. As the two largest integrated delivery systems in the market, the acquiring IDSs had considerable bargaining power for physician services prior to the acquisition. We expect horizontal integration of the legacy clinic systems with the three acquired multispecialty clinic systems would increase this bargaining power, leading to increased physician prices in both the acquired clinic systems and the legacy clinics.
It is important to note that our setting does not facilitate decomposing the impact of this provider consolidation on physician prices into the three potential sources of change: reduced transaction costs facilitating lower prices; tied contracting potentially leading to market power extension and increased prices; and horizontal integration leading to a more concentrated market and higher prices. Thus, we aim to estimate the net impact of these acquisition-related changes on physician prices in the legacy clinics and the acquired clinics when vertical integration also causes horizontal integration.
Because the horizontal integration associated with these acquisitions results in a loss of competition, we expect our withinmarket control clinic systems to respond to this loss of competition by raising prices. These effects are referred to as secondorder rival effects (Haas-Wilson and Garmon, 2009 ). Because our control clinic systems are in the same metropolitan area, we are unable to capture these second-order rival effects.
We could have chosen control clinic systems from a market outside the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area (Vogt et al., 2006) . That approach would allow observation of one or more clinic systems that could not possibly be affected by the acquisition in our study, but it would raise questions regarding the comparability of the control market, including mergers and acquisitions that might be taking place there. This challenge parallels that of the one faced by Garmon (2009, 2011) when studying the price impact of a hospital merger in the Chicago area. The managed care organizations contributing data to their study operated in Chicago and rural Illinois; Haas-Wilson and Garmon determined that the imperfect controls in the Chicago area were more valid than those in rural markets. We made the same determination regarding our Minnesota setting, given that the available alternatives would be small towns or rural settings.
Our acquisition effects thus measure the incremental changes in price for acquired and acquiring clinic systems relative to changes in price for other clinic systems in the area. For this reason, our acquisition effects should be interpreted as a lower bound for the impact of acquisitions that combine clinic systems. See Prager and Hannan (1998) for an example of this within-market incremental difference in prices driven by horizontal integration in the banking industry.
| METHODS

| Study setting
Near the end of 2007, three physician-owned multispecialty clinic systems, concentrated in the seven-county Twin Cities metropolitan area, were acquired by two hospital-owned IDSs. Specifically, the two clinic systems we label Acq1A and Acq1B were acquired by IDS1, and Acq2 was acquired by IDS2 ( Figure 1 ). These acquisitions generated meaningful changes in market concentration. IDS1's attributed patient panel grew by 23% and IDS2's attributed patient panel grew by 13%, on the basis of our data (Table 1 ). In total, IDS1 and IDS2 comprise 79 primary care locations prior to the acquisitions, and the acquired clinic systems included 18 primary care locations. Using proportion of evaluation and management (E&M) visits to estimate market shares, IDS1 and IDS2 together had a 20.2% market share prior to the acquisitions and a 22.6% market share after the acquisitions. Using E&M visits, we computed an acquisition-related increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) from 386 to 422; for primary care physicians only, HHI grew from 492 to 545.
5 These were the only substantive clinic system acquisitions in this metropolitan area during the time period of our study. It is appropriate to ask whether these acquisitions resulted from forces that affected the acquired clinic systems differently from other clinic systems in the metropolitan area. In related work (Christianson et al., 2014) , we examined the market trends encouraging this provider consolidation and found that it was motivated by metro-wide factors including total cost of care contracting and the need for improved electronic health records, suggesting that the changes were not motivated by events specific to the acquired clinic systems.
Our study is based on the population enrolled in a health plan operating in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. We followed plan enrollees attributed to these three clinic systems and the legacy clinics in the acquiring IDSs for 2 years prior to and 4 years after the acquisitions, and used enrollees attributed to clinic systems in three other IDSs and four other physician-owned clinic systems as controls (Figure 1 ). Attribution was conducted by the health plan, on the basis of majority of primary care visits.
The enrollees attributed to these 12 clinic systems (3 acquired, 2 acquiring, and 7 control) represent more than one quarter of the enrollees covered in the plan's commercial products from 2006 through 2011. These enrollees had access to a broad network of providers, with most (82%) of the enrollees in plans that allow in-network access to 95% of the area physicians. The clinic systems represented in our data were stable, with more than 99% of the in-network E&M visits billed by tax identification numbers present in the data before and after the acquisitions. The insurance market in the area is highly concentrated with the vast majority of commercial enrollees insured by just three health plans, including the plan contributing our data. There were no meaningful changes in the firms offering health insurance coverage during the period of our study, and the plan contributing data had a stable market share comprising 29-32% of the commercial (employment based) market over the time period in our study. For these reasons, we believe that our data are a sample representative of the market as a whole.
Our setting includes enrollees in five mutually exclusive groups. The first two groups are enrollees attributed to the "treatment clinic systems": (1) the three acquired multispecialty clinic systems (labeled Acq1A, Acq1B, and Acq2), with 22 primary care locations; and (2) the legacy clinics that already were owned by the two acquiring IDSs (IDS1 and IDS2). The remaining three groups of enrollees are attributed to "control clinic systems": (3) clinics owned by three IDSs (IDS3, IDS4, and IDS5) that provided hospital and multispecialty clinic services (one is hospital-owned, one is insurer-owned, and one is physician-owned); (4) two physician-only multispecialty clinic systems (MS1, MS2); and (5) two physician-only primary care clinic systems with limited specialty services (PC1, PC2).
| Data
The data are drawn from the health plan's administrative files. 6 In total, the study population includes 602,490 adult personyears across the six-year study period (2006 to 2011), with summary statistics shown in Table 1 . The study population had an average age of 43 and was weighted toward females (56%). By construction, the study population consists of enrollees who accessed primary care. Therefore, the population is slightly older and more female than the average across all adult enrollees in Minnesota (average age 41 and 53% female in 2011). Individual health risk is measured by resource utilization bands developed from the Johns Hopkins ACG system (Weiner et al., 1992) . To avoid issues of endogeneity, these health risk measures are based on the prior year's diagnosis code history. By using prior-year health risk, we are restricted to using only the person-years of data with a previous year of coverage. The only meaningful difference in population statistics caused by this restriction is a modest increase in the average age, from 42.7 to 43.2 years. The summary statistics include neighborhood effects drawn from the 2011 five-year American Community Survey (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012 ) and matched to the enrollee's residential address at the census-tract level. On average, the neighborhoods are primarily White and non-Hispanic (86%), English-speaking (89%), have at least a high school degree (56% without a 4-year college degree, 37% with a 4-year degree), and have few households below the federal poverty limit (8%). However, these averages mask a significant amount of variation. For example, the racial neighborhood effects in our population range from 0% White and non-Hispanic to 100% White and non-Hispanic.
The majority of the population is enrolled in a broad preferred provider organization network, but there is meaningful exposure in a more restricted network (18%). Seventy percent of the exposure is concentrated in the clinic systems affiliated with the three largest IDSs in the area (IDS1, IDS2, and IDS3) . Table 1 also displays differences in summary statistics between the acquired, acquiring, and control clinic systems. Enrollees attributed to the acquired clinic systems live in neighborhoods that are somewhat more racially diverse and with slightly higher poverty rates than the other two groups.
| Price variables
We are interested in the impact of horizontal integration of clinic systems on physician prices, when the acquisitions also include vertical integration of clinic systems and hospitals. We focus on the effect of those acquisitions on two measures of physician prices: an index of average price across all services, and prices for a set of common outpatient and inpatient procedures.
Our average price index and procedure-specific prices include services provided by all professionals: physicians, physicians' assistants, nurse practitioners, and other nonfacility providers. On average, 65% to 70% of allowed charges are billed by a provider with an MD or DO degree. For simplicity of expression, we use the term "physician prices" to describe these prices.
To create the measure of the care system's average prices, we computed the ratio of actual expenditures per member per month (PMPM) for physician services to PMPM expenditures computed using a standardized fee schedule:
Physician Price Index = (Actual PMPM Expenditures)/(Standardized PMPM Expenditures).
7
An enrollee's actual PMPM expenditure is the sum of allowed charges for physician services (excluding facility-billed services 8 ) provided to each attributed enrollee during a year, divided by the enrollee's months of enrollment in that year. "Allowed charges" refers to the amount actually paid by the health plan after negotiated provider discounts. These allowed charges were the total paid by both enrollee and plan.
The enrollee's standardized PMPM expenditure was computed by multiplying the enrollee's actual encounters in their attributed care system by prices from a common fee schedule. The common fee schedule was the average allowed charge for each CPT4 code across all providers and the 6 year timeframe. We multiplied actual encounters by these standardized fees, summed within a person-year, and divided by the enrollee's months of enrollment to calculate standardized PMPM expenditures.
The distribution of this index is a well-behaved bell-shaped curve with a mean near 1 by construction and more than 98% of the observations between 0 and 2 (see online appendix, Section 2). A price index of 1 indicates that the clinic system's prices (fees) are equal to the average price across time and provider groups; an index of 1.2 would indicate average prices 20% higher than the standardized fee schedule.
The second price measure is the actual paid amounts for five outpatient procedures and two inpatient procedures. The outpatient procedures include the two most common office visits for established patients (CPT4 codes 99213, 99214), the two most common preventive exams (99395, 99396), and the two most common office-based surgical procedures-aspirate or inject a major joint or bursa (20610), and destruction of benign lesions (17110). In addition, we included the two most common inpatient visits-subsequent care after admission (99232, 99233). These procedures were selected because they were the most common procedures in these categories, contributing significant dollars to total spending.
The health plan informed us that the fees for each procedure code could vary by calendar year, care system, provider specialty, provider credentialing level (MD, PA, NP, etc.), breadth of network (product), and clinic location. Credentialing level was not observable in our data; therefore, we computed average fees within cells defined by calendar year, procedure code, care system, provider specialty, breadth of network, and clinic location. We restricted the place of service for outpatient procedure codes to an office setting (excluding outpatient hospital settings), and procedure codes 99232 and 7 Because we include only plan enrollees who were attributed to a clinic system on the basis of their patterns of primary care, no enrollee has standardized expenditures equal to 0. 8 No locations in the acquired clinic systems were recategorized as outpatient hospital facilities after the acquisition, and there was no increase in the use of facility fees for services performed in the acquired clinic locations.
99233 to an inpatient setting (by definition). We checked to see how much residual variation in fees existed within these cells due to the unobservable provider credentialing level. Average coefficients of variation (each cell's residual standard deviation divided by that cell's mean price) were less than 10% for outpatient procedures and 10-20% for inpatient procedures.
| Econometric models
Our econometric models were classic difference-in-differences linear regression equations. Given observations from the 12 clinic systems over 6 years, the regressions were structured as follows:
Clinic System, Year, and Treat are indicator variables identifying, respectively, which clinic system the observation is from, the year of observation, and whether the observation was exposed to the clinic system acquisition (as acquired or acquiring entity) in that year. The fixed effects captured by the Clinic System vector control for time-invariant, unobserved clinic system characteristics. The treatment clinic systems were identified by j = 1-5, and the postacquisition years by t = 2008-2011. The vector of covariates x ijt controls for observed characteristics of the enrollee (i) and their environment. The treatment effects were the values of β 4jt , estimating the impacts of the acquisitions on acquired and acquiring clinic systems. We included an estimated effect for 2007 to test for differences in pre-acquisition trends from 2006 to 2007. By allowing the acquisition effects to vary by year, we can see how patterns in prices evolve over time. In the procedure-specific price regressions, the number of observations used to compute average prices within cells was used as an analytic weight to produce heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. All regressions cluster errors at the clinic system/year level.
| RESULTS
| Physician price index
The results of the regression for the physician price index are shown in Table 2 . Figure 2 displays the results graphically, comparing acquisition effects grouped by post-acquisition organizational affiliations. Because the index expresses the enrollee's average observed physician prices relative to the standardized fee schedule, an acquisition effect of 0.20 should be interpreted as an acquisition-related increase in prices equal to 20% of the standardized fee schedule. There are no statistically significant differences in the pre-acquisition trends (2006) (2007) in the treatment and control clinic systems. We see very little impact on prices in the acquired systems in the first year after the acquisition, then a steep increase through years two and three, with a flattening of the acquisition-related effect in year four.
9 There are some differences by clinic system, with Acq1A and Acq1B
showing the largest acquisition effects. We see smaller price increases among the legacy clinic systems in the acquiring IDSs than the increases in the acquired clinic systems, but with similar patterns over time. By 2011, average physician prices in the acquired clinic systems were 32%-47% higher than expected in absence of the acquisitions and average physician prices in the IDS legacy clinics were 14%-20% higher than expected. The price index varied with the mix of services associated with enrollee characteristics, tending to decline with enrollee's age, health status and for females. Neighborhood effects often were statistically significant, but small. For example, a 10-percentage point increase in the fraction of neighbors with a 4-year college degree would generate a price index change of only −0.003. The clinic system fixed effects captured an important source of price index variation; all clinic systems but IDS3 had lower price indices than the reference clinic system IDS1. Time trend moves in the direction expected, with price indices increasing at a steady pace from 2006 to 2011. 
| Professional procedure unit prices
The results of separate regressions for the four outpatient visit procedure codes are shown in Table 3 (graphically in Figure 3 ), the two outpatient surgical procedures are shown in Table 4 (graphically in Figure 4) , and the two inpatient procedure codes in Table 5 (graphically in Figure 5 ). Because the physician groups in Acq1B, MS1, PC1, and PC2 rely on hospitalists outside their group, they are not represented in the inpatient regressions. Acquisition effects for procedure-specific prices can be interpreted as the dollar difference in the procedure's price relative to the expected price without the acquisition. Although several of the 2007 pre-acquisition effects in Tables 3 and 4 By 2011, when all acquired clinic systems were paid under the acquiring IDSs' physician contracts, the prices for outpatient visits (Table 3, Figure 3 ) in acquired clinic systems were $26 to $60 higher than expected in absence of an acquisition, equivalent to 23%-35% of the mean prices (shown at the end of the table) for these outpatient visits. The acquisition effects on legacy clinic systems in the acquiring IDSs were more modest, with prices of visits increasing by $11 to $15 in 2011, equivalent to 10-15% of the mean prices for outpatient visits. The office-based surgical procedures had a less consistent pattern. While most of the effects in acquired clinic systems are positive, increases ranging from 11-33% of mean prices by 2011 (Table 4 , Figure 4 ), the ultimate change in price for 17110 in Acq1A was a 13% decrease, and the acquisition effects in acquiring clinic systems were flat to decreasing prices. The expected pattern reappears for inpatient visits (Table 5, Figure 5 ). For inpatient visits, we estimate 2011 acquisition-related increases of $29 to $54 in the acquired clinics (21-35% of the mean inpatient procedure prices) and acquisition-related increases of $10 to $18 in the acquiring clinics (9-13% of the mean inpatient procedure prices).
| Robustness tests
We conducted a series of robustness tests described in our online appendix. These include testing for the influence of serial correlation in the general error terms (Bertrand et al., 2004 ; Appendix Section 3), testing for sources of time-invariant correlation in errors not captured by the clinic system fixed effects (Appendix Section 4), examining sensitivity to the unbalanced nature of our panel data (Appendix Section 5), and testing sensitivity to our choice of control clinic systems (Appendix Section 6). All results are consistent with the baseline results presented here. We also test for differences in acquisition effects by provider type, to test whether a shift in provider mix might be driving the acquisition effects, and find little difference across provider type (Appendix Section 7). Finally, we ran a series of falsification tests treating alternate clinic systems and IDSs as if they were involved in acquisitions (Appendix Section 8). The results of these falsification tests support our conclusions. 
FIGURE 4
Office-based surgical procedures-acquisition effects by organizational affiliation. IDS = integrated delivery system 
| DISCUSSION
We examined the impact of acquisition of three multispecialty clinic systems by two hospital-owned IDSs on enrollee average and procedure-specific physician prices. We found evidence of an increase in physician prices at both the acquired clinic system and the acquiring IDS's legacy clinics: 4 years after the acquisitions (2011), average physician prices in the acquired clinic systems were 32-47% higher than the expected in absence of the acquisitions and average physician prices in the IDS legacy clinics were 14-20% higher than the expected. In the most comparable study of vertical integration on physician prices, Capps et al. (2015) find a similar growth in the impact of acquisition over time, ultimately estimating a 20% increase in prices 4 years after integration. 10 We note again that the control clinic systems come from the same market as the acquired clinic systems and the legacy clinics in the acquiring IDSs. Because we could not account for second-order rival effects from the horizontal integration that occurred with these acquisitions, our findings should be interpreted as a lower bound for the price impacts (Vogt et al., 2006, Haas-Wilson and Garmon, 2009 ). Although our data are limited to a single set of three acquisitions in a single market, our findings support the hypothesis that integration can result in increases in physician prices. Possible sources of price increase include horizontal integration between the new and legacy clinics, and tied hospital and clinic system contracting (Gal-Or, 1999) . This is an important empirical contribution to the literature on health care market organization, demonstrating nontrivial price responses resulting from vertical integration, possibly driven by the accompanying horizontal integration with the acquiring system's legacy clinics. These results are particularly germane given the incentives for vertical integration provided by public and private payer contracts with providers that include incentives for ACO formation to manage total cost of care, such as the Medicare Shared Saving Program.
It is important to note that these increases in prices do not necessarily imply a net reduction in the value of these health care services. We document elsewhere early evidence of acquisition-related improvements in cancer screening and more appropriate emergency department use (Carlin et al., 2015) . In addition, we found patterns of increased referrals to providers in the acquiring IDS (Carlin et al., 2016) . If this change in referral patterns led to better coordination of care across treatment environments, we would expect an increase in quality of care. Alternatively, if the change in referral patterns led to care delivered by lowerquality providers, the average quality of care would decline (Baker et al., 2015b) . The impact of acquisitions on the value of health care delivered is a balance between changes in price and quality, an area worthy of additional study.
